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**Homestead AFB After
Hurricane Andrew
--Whether to Rebuild or Not
A Critique on Base Closures
and Public Decisionmaking**

Dennis J. Hubscher, Sr.
U.S. Department of the Interior

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
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
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Homestead AFB

-- WHETHER TO REBUILD OR NOT

A CRITIQUE ON BASE CLOSURES
AND PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING

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April 5, 1993

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Homestead

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ABSTRACT

The closure and realignment of domestic military bases are previewed from an historical, legislative, evaluative, and decision-making process contexts.

Homestead AFB in the aftermath of its destruction is used as a point of reference and departure. Quantitative data strongly suggests that President Bush's immediate decision to rebuild the base was politically motivated and not militarily justified.

Political, economic, social, and military factors converge in the decision to close or leave open military bases. Many bases not deemed vital to our national interests remain open, costing the taxpayer billions of dollars. Local parochial interests, fearful of the adverse economic effects on surrounding communities, inhibit the closure of unneeded bases. The Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988 injected a decision-making process that removes, but does not eliminate, much of the political impediments to successfully closing or realigning bases. Additional improvements are recommended.

The study concludes by recognizing the evolving, as yet undefined, nature of our defense strategy for the future. The Clinton Administration needs to clearly define its vision for the nation and a grand strategy to achieve it. Within the context of this grand strategy, there is a paramount need to think and act globally, consistent with our national interests.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This is a preliminary look at the domestic military base closure and realignment decision-making process from the 1960's forward, and additional effort or study would be appropriate. A major assumption was made to rely on data from a comprehensive literature search on the historical evolution of modern day base closures and realignments, and responses from officials with expert knowledge on the political, military, social, and economic dynamics at play when such decisions are made. The extent to which the data collected and the representations of those with expert knowledge accurately reflect the conditions impacting base closure and realignments and the views of the public as a whole have a material bearing on the credibility attached to the study's conclusions and recommendations. The study is also limited by the extent to which its recommendations are acceptable to and implementable by our representative form of government.

Diligent efforts were made in the interpretation of data collected, and in accurately reflecting the opinions of experts and the public on the relevant issues.

This study is based primarily on the environment existing from shortly before the enactment of the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988, through today. Its recommendations should be carefully considered in the context of the tumultuous and changing global environment of the 1990's and beyond.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dennis J. Hubscher, Sr., (A.B.A., Benjamin Franklin University, 1966; C.P.A., State of Maryland, 1967; M.G.A., University of Maryland, 1989) is a thirty year career civil servant with broad experience in financial management, natural resources, and youth employment programs at Interior, Commerce, and the Pacific Northwest Regional Commission. He has served as a senior staff accountant assigned to Interior's Office of Financial Management since 1987. As Associate Director for Administration at Interior's Office of Youth Programs, he was instrumental in organizing, and later bringing to closure, two nation-wide youth initiatives during 1980-1987. Mr. Hubscher served as Staff Assistant and Regional Program Coordinator for the Federal Cochairman, Pacific Northwest Regional Commission, applying his financial and administrative expertise in advising Republican and Democratic presidential appointees and Governors on programs aimed at improving the quality of life for the people of the Pacific Northwest from 1974-1978. He provided general direction and supervision over budget and financial operations for the Office of the Secretary, Interior, from 1979-1980. Mr. Hubscher has been the recipient of numerous outstanding performance and special achievement awards over his career, including the Department of the Interior Honor Award for Meritorious Service. He is Class Vice President and a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Class of 1993.

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HOMESTEAD AFB AFTER HURRICANE ANDREW:

-- Whether to Rebuild or Not

A Critique on Base Closures and Public Decision-making

INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew, President Bush announced the Administration's decision to rebuild Homestead AFB. As Homestead AFB was considered a likely candidate for closure during the 1991 base closure deliberation process, and with the country approaching a national election, the President's decision was viewed by some as cast with political overtones.

This report analyzes the public decision-making process used in determining the future of Homestead AFB in the aftermath of the enormous destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew on August 24, 1992. With Homestead serving as a point of reference, comparisons are made with the decision-making process used to determine when a military base should be closed. Events taking place around the world and within the United States have caused a reevaluation of our military strategy, and U.S. forces are to be significantly reduced.¹ Many military bases are strong candidates for closure. Competition for the defense dollar will be high. Yet, history has shown it to be exceedingly difficult to reach political consensus on the closure of military bases.

With the next round of base closure decisions to be made in mid-1993, Homestead AFB serves as a useful case to examine the sufficiency of the decision to rebuild contrasted against the criteria used for base closure decisions. The effectiveness of the decision-making process used to close military bases is also examined from strategic, political, economic, and military perspectives for lessons learned and for alternatives to achieve greater efficiency in an era of changing roles and missions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical Overview of Base Closures

In the early sixties Defense Secretary Robert McNamara undertook the most extensive military base realignment and closure program in U. S. history.² Acting with Presidential approval, he initiated a cost cutting drive affecting hundreds of sites throughout the country, including more than 60 major installations intended to be completely shut down.³ Although Congress was furious, legislative attempts to overturn the closures or to block unilateral Pentagon action failed until President Carter signed into law a bill requiring Congressional approval for any closure affecting 300 or more civilian employees in 1978.⁴

Between 1970 and 1983, during a period when the military labor force declined by almost 25%, the number of bases closed represented less than 10% of the Department of Defense (DOD)

inventory.⁵ Most of these closures occurred as a result of the Vietnam draw-down. The Carter and Reagan Administrations took steps to close military bases. The 1983 President's Private Sector Study on Cost Control (Grace Commission) recommended an aggressive program to close or realign a significant number of bases.⁶ A near consensus of key decision-makers (CBO, OMB, GAO, DOD, and the Congress) agreed that a significant number of military bases should be closed as a cost savings and efficiency measure. Yet, no major base closures occurred between 1981 and 1986.⁷ A military build-up coupled with highly restrictive legislation effectively barred DOD from realigning any major base.⁸ Only the Congress had the power to remedy the situation.

On March 12, 1987, H.R.1583 was introduced in the House of Representatives "To establish the Bipartisan Commission on the Consolidation of Military Bases." Cited as the Defense Savings Act, H.R. 1583's preamble noted:

(a) substantial resources were being directed to maintaining certain military installations which have little or no military value; and,

(b) past efforts to eliminate such installations were frustrated by various private interests.⁹

Estimated savings from the base realignment program ranged from \$1 to \$5 billion, a significant sum in times of tight budgets.¹⁰ Several political impediments had to be overcome by this

legislation:

- (a) pork barrel parochialism of Members of Congress maneuvering to keep open military bases long after changes in the threat, technology, or the force structure rendered them obsolete; and,
- (b) widespread fear in Congress that an Administration with unrestricted base closure power may use that power as a political weapon.

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (BRAC) of 1988

Public Law 100-526 was enacted to remove politics from the base closure process by establishing the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (Commission). A unique feature of this law required that Congress approve or reject in total the Commission's recommendations. The Commission recommended that 86 bases be closed, 5 be partly closed, and 54 others be realigned, for an annual savings of \$694 million.¹¹ Congress approved the recommendations. GAO found the methodology developed and used by the Commission was generally sound. However, GAO also found some errors were made in implementing the methodology, and estimates of annual savings were overstated by about \$170 million.¹²

1990 Recommended Closures and Realignments

In January 1990, the Secretary of Defense recommended the closure of 35 additional installations and the realignment or reduction of forces at more than 20 other installations.

Specific written guidance was not provided to the services on how to evaluate bases, and none of the services selected candidate bases using a process as comprehensive and as well documented as the one followed by the 1988 Commission.¹³ The House Armed Services Committee rejected the list on the grounds that a disproportionate number of bases were in Democratic districts.¹⁴

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990

Public Law 101-510 was enacted to make improvements over the processes legislated in 1988, ensure that all installations be equally considered for possible closure or realignment, and halt any closure actions based upon the 1990 recommendations. It contemplates much more dramatic reductions in the number of U. S. bases. To that end, it created an independent commission with an extended life that would make recommendations for closure in 1991, 1993, and 1995. Congress and the executive branch share powers in the process, and must adhere to a series of steps and deadlines for reaching agreement on which bases to close.¹⁵

Process and Criteria for Closures Under P.L. 101-510

Basically DOD had to satisfy three requirements to comply with the law: develop selection criteria for use in evaluating bases, prepare a Force Structure Plan covering fiscal years 1992 through 1997, and recommend bases for closure or realignment.¹⁶ The criteria is summarized in the following table.¹⁷

**Table 1.1: DOD Criteria for Selecting
Bases for Closure or Realignment**

Category	Criteria
Military value	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of DOD's total force.2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.4. The cost and manpower implications.
Return on investment	<ol style="list-style-type: none">5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
Impacts	<ol style="list-style-type: none">6. The economic impact on communities.7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.8. The environmental impact.

DOD issued various policies in 1990-1991 to implement the law, including provisions giving priority to the first four criteria related to military value. DOD also directed the services to use the Cost of Base Realignment Action (COBRA) model to estimate the costs and savings associated with their recommendations. The specific findings and conclusions of DOD, embodied within its final recommendations, are beyond the scope of this report.¹⁸

The Commission's duties were to review and analyze DOD's recommendations, conduct public hearings on them, and then to prepare and submit its own recommendations to the President for approval by July 1.

The President has until July 15 to approve or disapprove the Commission's recommendations in whole or part. If he approves the Commission's report, it is sent to Congress, where each house

must consider it without amendment. Congress has 45 days to enact a joint resolution of disapproval; otherwise, the Commission's recommendations are adopted.¹⁹

If the President disapproves the Commission's report, the Commission may submit an independent list of recommendations by August 15. If the President has not transmitted his approval to Congress by September 1, the realignment process for that year ends.²⁰

1991 Base Closure Actions

DOD recommended 43 bases for closure and 28 for realignment in 1991. An additional 36 military installations were named as preliminary candidates for closure or realignment by the Commission.²¹ Appendix A contains the list of preliminary candidates, the rationale for their consideration, and a summary of the Commission voting by installation. During June 1991, the Commission voted to remove from consideration 11 installations included on its preliminary list, including Homestead AFB. The Commission's final recommendations were submitted to the President and adopted by the Congress in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 101-510. In the House, 64 members voted against the Commission's recommendations. The Senate did not bring the measure to the floor for a vote. In total, 34 military installations will be closed and 48 realigned as a result of the 1991 review process.²²

GAO Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignment²³

GAO found the DOD process, when properly implemented, allows for a reduction in the U.S. military base structure by emphasizing the military value of the installations. GAO observed the following:

1. Insignificant inconsistencies in the way Army and the Air Force developed military value rankings for quantifiable attributes used to compare similar installations. The Army and Air Force recommendations were adequately supported;
2. The Navy was unable to document the rationale for its decisions because it lacked sufficient documentation to support its efforts. The Navy will have significant excess berthing capacity if only the recommended facilities are closed. Changes have occurred in the strategic homeporting concept, which when combined with excess available pier space for berthing ships, supports the recommendation for fewer Navy bases; and,
3. DOD's guidance allowed estimating processes and cost factors used by the services to vary, particularly as it pertains to the projected payback period to recover closing costs (i.e., COBRA²⁴ model). Without DOD oversight, each service approached common problems in different ways -- hence, no comparability.

1991 Base Closure Position: Homestead AFB²⁵

The Air Force predicated its decision to close 15 CONUS air

force bases on such factors as the disintegrated Warsaw Pact, reduced Soviet threat, and rapidly declining DOD budget and manpower reductions. The Air Force context for the future is global reach--global power, reduced forward basing, composite wing, A-10 Army support, and lessons learned from Desert Storm. Five of the 15 bases are excess capacity "flying-tactical," the subcategory of Homestead AFB. All flying-tactical bases were evaluated by five "options" of priority on military value, and assigned to one of three groups to signify relative importance. While Homestead AFB was not included as one of the five bases to be closed, it was ranked in the lowest group for four of the five options.

The Commission included Homestead AFB as a preliminary candidate for closure or realignment because of its low ranking by the Air Force. Testimony before the Commission on June 1, 1991, included the following as justification for keeping Homestead open: (a) its proximity to Cuba; (b) it has an air national guard alert detachment; (c) its increased role, as far as South America with the impending closure of Howard in the Canal Zone; (d) support for a number of other agencies; (e) outstanding air-to-air training facilities; and, (f) it is home of the Air Force Conference Center.²⁶ Commission Chairman Courter stated, "On Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, I am personally convinced that there is an important strategic and

classified need for the foreseeable future in maintaining that as a facility, and I see no reason why we should further consider it."²⁷ Commissioner Callaway later stated, "Now, I am convinced that the Secretary of the Air Force has legitimate strategic reason, which we have been briefed on in classified briefing, for keeping Homestead open."²⁸ Commissioner Smith concluded, "... In some other discussion with Commissioner Cassidy, he almost persuaded me that Homestead ought to be on the list I, for one, am not convinced as Commissioner Callaway is, that there are good, cogent, strategic reasons to leave Homestead on."²⁹ The Commission vote to remove Homestead AFB from further action was 5-2.

Homestead AFB won a reprieve in large measure by belief of a strategic classified need to keep it open. However, its low Air Force ranking and negative votes by several Commissioners cast some doubt whether the correct decision was reached.

Hurricane Andrew and its Aftermath

Hurricane Andrew struck on August 24, 1992, obliterating Homestead AFB and a large part of southern Florida. Damage and human suffering was great:

Up to \$20 billion in damage;

250,000 homeless (1 in 8 families in South Miami);

85,000 unusable houses;

525,000 customers without electricity;³⁰ and, 41 deaths.³¹

After a three day hiatus, the President ordered DOD to provide comprehensive help to the devastated area.³² The Army did a superb job in spearheading the effort. Disaster assistance personnel peaked at 23,587 on September 12, 1992; fewer than 100 troops remained in the wrecked areas after October 14, 1992. Support provided to the disaster area included over a million MRE's; 897,783 meals fed; 441,000 cubic yards of debris removed; 35 prime power units, and 262 generators; 2,879 tents, 54,884 cots, and 100,000 blankets; 48,919 medical patients; 4,701 vehicles; 157 helicopters; 20,500 radios; and, over \$.5 billion in contract and COE support.³³ While DOD's provision of disaster relief to Homestead is not directly related to the primary focus of this study, it offers some interesting perceptions on military roles and missions, and will be discussed later in this report.

Damage to Homestead AFB and the Decision to Rebuild

Almost all of the 10 working buildings and the dining hall were declared condemned; its 1,000 houses were unserviceable.³⁴ It happened before: A hurricane erased everything in September 1945.³⁵ The decision is still out on whether it will rise from the ashes again. After reviewing the damage, a senior Four-Star General described the scene as follows:

"I went down there and looked at it. I mean I've never seen anything like it. It was like it was near an atomic bomb, and the over-pressure just blew the place down. Incredible. The only thing that survived were some World

War II quonset huts where the over-pressure rolled over. Anything that was square and faced it is gone."³⁶

On September 1, 1992, the President directed DOD to rebuild Homestead AFB.³⁷ On September 8, the President submitted to the Congress emergency supplemental requests of \$7.6 billion to address the effects of Hurricane Andrew, including \$480.6 million to rebuild Homestead AFB.³⁸

Opposition to Rebuilding Homestead

Immediate opposition surfaced. Cries of pork barrel and election eve politics were heard across the country and in the Congress. A few quotes put the politics of the issue in context:

"We've just been through the base-closure process designed to take politics out of the decision-making. Now, nine weeks before the election, the President goes down there to Florida and makes a mockery of the process"³⁹

"President Bush's snap decision yesterday to rebuild Homestead Air Force Base ... raised eyebrows on Capitol Hill, where the smell of election-year pork was detected. If they're looking for \$200 million for Homestead, the reaction up here is going to be, You've got to be kidding"⁴⁰

"Rebuilding the base will cost as much as \$500 million. Such an investment should not be made without a strong military rationale. Bush has not provided one. In fact, prior to the disaster, the base was considered a good candidate for closing. Even Florida politicians have suggested moving Homestead's functions to the remaining nine bases in Florida."⁴¹

The Congress Responds

On September 18, 1992, Congress approved an \$11.1 billion disaster relief bill, providing \$9 billion of emergency aid to Florida. The bill included \$92 million to restore the airfield and rebuild facilities for the U.S. Customs Service and the Air National Guard.⁴² In moving the bill through the House and the Senate, clear expressions of intent indicated that funds were not to be used to resume Air Force operations at the base. "It does not prejudge the work of the Base Closure Commission," according to Senator Nunn, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee.⁴³

APPROACH METHODOLOGY

Solution Strategy

The month following Hurricane Andrew set the stage for a timely critique of how massive devastation would effect decision-making processes during a highly charged Presidential election. The approach used to examine the effectiveness of the military base closure decision-making process relied primarily on the review of available subject-related literature, independent data collection and analysis, and interviews with individuals having relevant knowledge and expertise. Homestead AFB was used as part of the deliberative process due to: (a) its historical context as a base considered for closure due to a relatively low military value; and, (b) its emergence as a lightning rod for controversy regarding its future usefulness after being virtually destroyed

by Hurricane Andrew. This process involved the following tasks:

Data Collection and Analysis

1. Homestead AFB

A. Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)

Questionnaire. A questionnaire (Appendix C-1) was constructed to assess the personal opinions of the ICAF student body on critical issues surrounding the rebuilding of Homestead AFB. Each group of ICAF students (i.e., Army, Navy, Air Force, Civilian, etc.) are inherently different. Group perceptions on Homestead AFB were expected to differ. Responses from the questionnaire produced the detailed descriptive statistics in Appendix C-2. Since over two-thirds of the students are active senior military officers and the remainder are career civil servants, they (1) were expected to have a high level of judgmental knowledge in accurately assessing the military significance of Homestead AFB and its relative utility as part of the Defense infrastructure; but, (2) were not expected to reflect the views of the American populous as a whole. A more rounded perspective was obtained from interviews with political and military leaders, representatives of "think tank" organizations, and by examination of differing opinions expressed through the media.

The first segment of the questionnaire used a five-point Likert scale. Each student assigned an ordered value to eight statements to indicate the degree of agreement with several

critical issues. Points were assigned to score this segment of the questionnaire as follows: +2 for a strongly agree response, +1 for an agree response, 0 for neutral/uncertain, -1 for disagree, and -2 for strongly disagree.

The second segment used an absolute rating scale from 1 to 10 to indicate an overall opinion as to whether Homestead should be rebuilt. The second segment served as a summation statement and was expected to show a correlation with the responses from the first segment.

The ICAF student body is composed of at least eight different groups of military officers and civil servants. The entire student body was included in the sample. Each student was asked to anonymously complete the questionnaire and place it in a collection box in the student mailroom. A 50% or better response rate was expected within one week of questionnaire distribution.

B. Questionnaire Administration. Questionnaires were distributed to each ICAF student's mailbox on October 13, 1992. Nearly half of the completed surveys were returned within one day. October 19, 1992, was the cut-off date for the acceptance of completed surveys. A 61% response rate was acceptable.

Table 2. Questionnaire Response Rate


October 19, 1992

<u>No. of Students Sampled</u>	<u>No. of Responses Received</u>	<u>Response Rate</u>
228	138	61%

Figure 1.

HOMESTEAD AFB ICAF STUDENT PARTICIPATION

138 RESPONSES (61%) OUT OF 228 SURVEYS DISTRIBUTED



C. Congruency in Questionnaire Responses. Respondents to the questionnaire indicated general agreement with the following points:

(1) The President's decision to rebuild was an election-eve maneuver to get Florida votes;

(2) The funds needed to rebuild Homestead AFB could be used more effectively to meet other priority military needs;

(3) Homestead's functions should be permanently reassigned to other installations;


(4) Politics should stay out of the decision-making process on the future of Homestead AFB; and,

(5) Little military justification exists to rebuild Homestead AFB.

On a scale from 1 (Don't Rebuild) to 10 (Rebuild), a median score of 2.2 to the overall summation statement indicated a strong opinion that Homestead AFB should not be rebuilt.

Figure 2.

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D. "Think Tank" Interviews. As part of question and answer sessions on public policy formulation at local "think tanks" in Washington, D. C., senior representatives were asked for their views on Homestead AFB. The responses mirrored those of the ICAF student body in terms of little military justification for rebuilding Homestead AFB, and, the decision to rebuild being politically inspired. The interviews were not for attribution. However, quotable sources from think tank representatives follow:

"Unfortunately for logic, this is an election year, and therefore all decisions are made with their impact on the election in mind, even military decisions. Considering this, the President has chosen to spend millions of dollars to rebuild Homestead, even at a time when defense dollars are short and getting shorter. Congress can move to stop

this apparent waste of defense dollars----but given Congress's record on pork barrel politics, this is unlikely."⁴⁴ [Center for Defense Information (CDI)]

"... Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan, says rebuilding Homestead 'makes no sense militarily.' Korb told the Boston Globe that the base's mission is outdated and the cost of rebuilding might reach \$1 billion of scarce Pentagon dollars."⁴⁵ (Dr. Lawrence J. Korb is Director of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at The Brookings Institution.)

E. A senior Four-Star General provided the following comments about Homestead AFB before the Presidential election:

"It is one thing to close a base over a period of years and another thing to shut it down overnight because of a hurricane. The correct decision has been made to rebuild it."⁴⁶

Several months later, after the election, he made the following comments:

"... It came along at a very interesting political time. So initial commitment was made by the President to rebuild it. Congress has scaled that back down. My judgment is it would be best if we did the absolute minimum at Homestead. We can find other places to perform most of that mission. But we'll probably have to do some level of rebuilding. I'm not prepared to suggest to you how much that is. You also have to remember there really are human beings out there who have relied on a place like that for decades. And, when you

suddenly just turn the lights out, you're creating a problem that maybe you should be a little more sensitive to."⁴⁷

F. Editorials and Columnists. In an attempt to get a broader perspective, a search of additional newspaper sources found eight articles in favor of closing Homestead AFB, or questioning the rush to rebuild it (a rationale previously covered and not requiring further discussion).⁴⁸ One article was found in favor of rebuilding⁴⁹ -- the rationale was justified on two fundamental points: (1) social/economic needs of the region; and, (2) Homestead AFB's importance for national defense purposes (i.e., Cuba, and drug interdiction).

2. Effectiveness of Base Closure Decision-making Process

Webster⁵⁰ defines effective as " ... producing a definite or desired result; efficient equipped and ready for combat, as a sailor or ship." There is no standard to gauge what the desired result should be, insofar as base closures are concerned, let alone whether it was achieved. The scope of this report does not allow for empirical study of this issue. It does, however, afford the opportunity to offer several generalizations on the power to produce intended results in several contexts.

From an economic perspective, military bases are the major contributors to the economic vitality of most communities where they are located. Homestead AFB is a good example. It accounted for 8,400 military and civilian jobs, and its \$405 million

expended annually was more than 25% of the local economy.⁵¹

Base expansions and contractions seriously effect the economic conditions in their immediate localities. Special interest groups and the public are strong, vocal constituents for such bases, whether they make a vital contribution to our military capabilities or not. Hence, there is a local economic good attached to military bases, supported by the entire populous.

Bases are essential to support the military infrastructure. For centuries our republic has depended on a standing army as a defense against our enemies. The benefits accruing to the nation from a strong military is not a question for this paper. Rather, the salient question is whether we are achieving the intended result from our base structure. The answer appears to be no, or at least not as well as we could. Politics, rather than an over-arching national strategy, is the big factor in arriving at the correct answer to the question of effectiveness. In addition to the literature review and historical overview of base closures (pages 2 to 13), the following from a senior Four-Star General says it all:

(Base Structure)

"Our global war base structure is still there. Its worse than a Cold War base structure. The Army base structure dates from the Civil War and Indian Wars. You go across the western part of the United States and there they are, Fort Apache's, one after another. The Air Force base structure

to some extent reflects the range of B-47 bombers at the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. So we have a very irrational base structure. We want to get at it. We want to close these places. We want to close huge strategic command bases that are housing an A-10 squadron. We want to close depots that are no longer needed to keep up the high rate of repair on aircraft. What for? So they can get to Europe to fight the Cold War! We still got a depot structure that fixes all the stuff in order to get it back into the war that's gone. All that has to be brought down.'

(Politics)

"Congress can't stand it! All politics is local, and you don't know what its like to have the most liberal, anti-Defense member of Congress chew you out fiercely for four hours, and then, by the time you get back to your office, he's on the phone: 'I know, I didn't mean Fort so and so' The interest is intense on protecting bases.

(Base Closure Process)

"We kept sending up base closures. We couldn't get them through Congress. So, finally to break the log jam, we formed the Base Closure Commission process. Congress forced it down our throat. We didn't want it. The only way you're going to get at it. So you do your base closure analysis. You send up one package, and the whole package gets voted on -- everything in it -- all up or all down. And that's what they've done the last two years. Why does it work? Pure politics. You know how to stop -- you know how to cause that to fall apart? If you ever put on the base closure list more than 268 closures, it won't work. As long as fewer are offended than not offended you can get the package through. Well, sorry about old Sam -- he lost his base, but

mine wasn't on there! That's how we've gotten it to work.'

(Next Year)

"We're going to send them one next year that's going to knock their socks off! Because part of the roles and missions study, we're generating up a lot of things we no longer need. Don't need twelve initial pilot training facilities. We've got them. We don't need them anymore. But every time you try to get at one of them, you're taking jobs out of some Congressman's community. But, nevertheless, we're going to shove it out there. So, the process works. The only way to make it work in this wonderful political system we have, and we're going to continue to use it."⁵²

3. Additional Closure Criteria

While the present base closure criteria (Table 1) is generally accepted by most authorities, additional criteria has been suggested. Most notable are those of the GAO. The GAO believes that cost and savings criteria should be a major consideration when the Department evaluates industrial activities such as maintenance depots.⁵³ Technical recommendations for improving DOD's COBRA model and greater oversight of the cost-estimating process were also recommended by GAO.⁵⁴ Geographic equity and environmental clean-up costs recommended by Members of Congress may also have some merit.⁵⁵

4. Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study (DMCS)

The DMCS was conducted in the fall of 1992 to review current capabilities, assess future requirements, and recommend to the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) a depot structure to best meet those requirements. The fundamental thrust was to reduce excess capacity and eliminate duplication through BRAC. Depot maintenance is a big business: \$13 billion annual budget; 30 major facilities; 132,000 civilian and DOD employees; and 700,000 pieces of equipment.⁵⁶ Three retired Generals, a retired Vice Admiral, and a retired TWA executive made up the DMCS Executive Working Group, and the J-4 Studies, Concepts, and Analysis Division (SCAD) provided the study support staff.

The DMCS⁵⁷ highlighted several depot maintenance problems:

- Excess capacity
- Unnecessary duplicate capability
- Duplicate investments in new technology
- No effective structure/process for implementing joint solutions to excess infrastructure
- No effective structure/process to optimize cost savings
- Perceived by many that Services will not solve the problem

A significant finding was that only 2.8% (\$360.2 million) of the \$13 billion allocated for FY 91 depot maintenance was used to provide interservicing.⁵⁸ The study also identified 25-50% more capacity than needed, and found that unnecessary duplication exists throughout the depot system.⁵⁹

The DMCS recommended (1) the establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command, to be responsible for all depot maintenance; and, (2) the Secretary of Defense direct the Services to submit integrated BRAC inputs. (See: Appendix D for current memoranda and additional information on the DMCS' efforts.) On December 3, 1992, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Services " ... to prepare integrated proposals, with cross-Service inputs, to streamline defense depot maintenance activities," for the Secretary's consideration for the 1993 BRAC submission.⁶⁰

On January 22, 1993, the CJCS informed the Secretary of Defense that, "The Services' response falls short of doing what is required."⁶¹ The CJCS indicated the response " ... was consistent with one of the lesser options of the Consolidation Study but significantly less than expected with increased levels of depot interservicing."⁶² The response did not address fixed-wing aviation, the area with the greatest additional savings potential.⁶³ Unfortunately, the Services do not appear to be moving forward to fully achieve the economies of scale intended by the DMCS and the CJCS. The issue is currently before the new Secretary of Defense for resolution.

5. Base Closures Are Not Necessarily Bad

Many benefits accrue from the closure of unneeded bases. Significant continuing annual savings are anticipated from the first round of base closures. Between FY 89 and FY 95, the

taxpayer can expect to realize a net gain of over \$500 million, and \$700 million a year thereafter.⁶⁴ These savings, however, may be partially off-set when DOD is required to transfer property at no cost to other Federal agencies or States and localities. The disposal of unneeded bases also triggers DOD to ensure their environmental restoration as part of the closure process -- something it is not otherwise required or likely to do. The DOD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) also provides local communities with a number of programs to mitigate adverse affects during the transition process. According to OEA, base reuse planning is nearing completion at all ten closure locations -- it expects " ... to produce success stories at each major closure site."⁶⁵

The Presidio is a good example. The National Park Service (NPS) plans to convert this once strategic Army base into a "global environmental center dedicated to education, research and a search for solutions to the world's problems."⁶⁶ According to NPS, "The old world order was based on defense, but we're moving toward a new world order based on the environment and health and education. We want the Presidio to symbolize that."⁶⁷ Apparently Mikhail Gorbachev agrees; he told park officials no setting could be more fitting for the rest of his life's work and an ideal setting for the Gorbachev Foundation.⁶⁸ Amazing! Who knows -- perhaps the Presidio and many of the other bases to be

closed will be put to many worthwhile and productive uses.

6. Changing Roles and Missions for the Military

The base force structure is dictated in large part by the roles and missions each service component must meet in defending our national interests. Section 402 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 mandated a study to provide "comprehensive analytic information" that will allow the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the "mix of reserve and active forces ... that are considered acceptable to carry out expected future military operations."⁶⁹ RAND's final report to the Secretary of Defense was released to the public early this year. Of particular interest is its assessment of Total Force Policy, its evaluation of alternative force structures (i.e., future active and reserve forces), and the implications of the study.⁷⁰

Total Force Policy requires reliance on reserve forces as the primary augmentation for the active forces; and, integrated use of all available personnel -- active, reserve, civilian, and allied. Several military organizations and many in Congress believe active and reserve units should be so interdependent that a president could not send military forces to combat without activating the reserves.⁷¹ Yet, if more support units are put into the reserve components, the president will have no choice but to call up the reserves even before he makes a final decision

to deploy forces.⁷² In structuring forces, two criteria are significant: (1) cost effectiveness; and, (2) the political criterion -- the political will of the people.⁷³ How active and reserve forces are integrated dictates the form that alternative structures take.⁷⁴

Defense planning guidance for future military missions is based upon crisis response to major regional contingencies, concurrent contingencies, lesser regional contingencies, and reconstitution in lieu of major global threat from a large Soviet empire.⁷⁵ In meeting future crises, the use of reserve combat forces requires that " ... decisive force must be deployed as soon as possible and should not wait until reserve combat units can be ready."⁷⁶ RAND's study focuses on the mandate to develop and assess smaller force structures at lower budget levels than the Base Force level (i.e., Aspin C). No single alternative force structure is dominantly more effective than the others at meeting future military requirements.⁷⁷ Military forces potentially have conflict and non-conflict roles which are not inherently threatened by alternative force structures. Of paramount concern is the defining characteristic of our national military strategy (now uncertain) brought about by the change of administration and a new Congress, new ways for integrating active and reserve forces, and the potential that the projected force structure is not so robust that the active components can

go it alone under certain scenarios.⁷⁸

Other voices in the press and elsewhere call for sharp reductions below the Base Force level, and support alternative roles for military personnel. For example,

-- CDI argues for a cut of \$110 billion in the defense budget.⁷⁹ CDI's proposal "... does not make major changes in existing military missions but concludes that these missions can be performed for about \$197 Billion a year in 1995 with 1,045,000 active and 1,007,000 reserve personnel."⁸⁰

-- Lawrence Korb suggests "... we can safely cut the defense budget to roughly half its current size over the next decade, while continuing our active engagement with the world."⁸¹ Korb makes the following points: (a) defense spending should be constructed from the bottom up, using a threat-based approach for outlining the forces we need; (b) spend taxpayer dollars only when we have genuine security needs; (c) nations that want U.S. forces on their soil should pay 50 to 70 percent of the full cost of the deployed troops; (d) the need for a serious investment in easing the transition for people and communities affected by defense cutbacks; and, (e) notes education, law enforcement, and health care as three pressing needs which former military personnel can help us address.

-- Press clippings attest to the winds of change in what some see as non-traditional military roles and missions around

the globe and domestically. Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, and countering illicit drugs are just a few that stretch from desolate far away places (Somalia; Northern Iraq) to the heart of our nation's cities (Los Angeles; Homestead). Because of DOD's success and FEMA's poor perception in administering disaster relief, the thought of giving this role to DOD is receiving mixed reviews within the military.

7. President Clinton Responds on Homestead AFB

In his first town hall meeting on February 10, 1993, the President was asked what his plans were for rebuilding Homestead AFB.⁸² President Clinton indicated his belief that the Congress made the right decision in deferring the question of whether the base should be rebuilt to BRAC.⁸³ If Homestead AFB can be justified based on the BRAC criteria, the President believes the base should be rebuilt.⁸⁴ If BRAC decides Homestead AFB is not justified militarily, President Clinton expressed support for a "mixed-use" installation that will rebuild "enough support systems ... to generate an equal amount of jobs" for the local community.⁸⁵

Findings and Conclusions

This study finds that the public decision-making process used to determine when a military base should be closed or remain open has significantly improved since 1988 largely due to BRAC and the application of pre-defined base closure criteria.

Parochial interests adversely impact achieving the most effective military base structure, costing the nation billions of dollars. President Bush's attempt to rebuild Homestead AFB is a good illustration of political motivation attempting to serve parochial interests. More can be done to further improve the decision-making process. The study findings and conclusions, followed by specific recommendations, are summarized below:

1. During the decade following the Vietnam War, the decline of the military labor force was 2 1/2 times the number of bases closed by DOD. Parochial politics significantly inhibited the closure of unneeded bases.

2. BRAC was enacted to remove parochial politics, advance the closure of unneeded bases, and save billions of dollars.

3. BRAC significantly reduced, but did not eliminate, parochial politics from the base closure decision-making process.

4. The base closure decision-making process is functioning satisfactorily, but it can and should be improved.

5. Keeping Homestead AFB off the 1991 final base closure list was marginally justified for strategic military reasons. DOD considered Homestead AFB's military value low compared to many other bases.

6. By most accounts, President Bush's decision to rebuild Homestead AFB after its destruction was politically motivated, and not militarily justified as an effective use of scarce

resources.

7. Billions of dollars can be saved if the nation has the political will to close military installations (bases and depots) that are not making a vital contribution to our national defense. But, local parochial interests press for these installations to remain open, primarily because of the fear of adverse economic consequences. Ominously, a majority of the new members of Congress have expressed interest in keeping military bases in their districts open.⁸⁶ The Services within DOD are frustrating the CJCS in achieving billions of dollars in savings by not moving forward aggressively in implementing the DMCS recommendations and directives from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And, not surprisingly, a Washington Post report⁸⁷ on the CJCS' roles and missions study finds that the military reshaping plan falls short of Clinton Administration goals. Pure politics at every turn!

8. The evolving defense strategy for the future is based upon crisis response to major regional contingencies, rather than a major global threat from a large Soviet empire that is no more. While the defining characteristics of this strategy are far from certain, it is clear the nation's investment in defense will be on a steep decline if the course of events maintain their present direction.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Clinton Administration needs to clearly define its

vision for the nation and a strategy to achieve it. This vision needs to be in harmony with our perceived values and interests.

2. Once defined, the Administration needs to work cooperatively with other key decision makers (i.e., the Congress) in exercising the elements of national power to accomplish its strategy through the prudent use of available resources.

3. The Administration must seek political consensus and popular support of its initiatives, globally and domestically.

In essence, a grand strategy is required.

4. Within the context of this grand strategy, the following is recommended:

(a) When it comes to making decisions on defense issues such as force structure, base closures and realignment -- and the military, economic, and political consequences of such decisions, our leaders must think and act globally, consistent with our national interests.

(b) Remove from consideration local, parochial interests to the maximum extent possible, always mindful of the lasting benefits of our representative form of government.

(c) Make optimum use of NATO, the United Nations, and bi-lateral agreements and international coalitions to achieve our

aims. Increase burdensharing; the use of "places, not bases"⁸⁸ for military deployments and reach; and continued emphasis on joint and combined forces from a national and global perspective. Seek international cooperation and support for a quick reaction force to contain and resolve conflicts, including development of a structure and planning capability within NATO and/or the U.N. (i.e., National Security Directive 74).

(d) Critically focus on the key issues: For what events (militarily/economically/politically) must the U.S. be prepared?

(e) Fully implementing the recommendations of the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study, including establishment of a Joint Depot Maintenance Command. Resist efforts to centralize within the Services; interservicing across the Services offers much promise for greater depot efficiency and effectiveness.

(f) Adopt the technical recommendations of the GAO noted on Page 22 regarding additional base closure and realignment criteria, improve the COBRA model, and provide greater oversight of the cost-estimating process. Broaden DOD's criteria under BRAC, particularly the inclusion of environmental clean-up costs. Although somewhat outside the scope of this report, environmental degradation of lands under military and Federal control requires far greater national efforts toward prevention and renewal. Give cost and savings at least equal weight to the military criteria in reaching decisions on the closure of military installations.

(g) Permanently extend BRAC beyond its scheduled 1995 expiration date. BRAC has proven to be an effective mechanism for accomplishing its intended objectives.

(h) Continue to make innovative use of installations and infrastructure no longer needed for our vital military interests. If BRAC decides that Homestead AFB is not militarily justified, move forward with the alternative mixed-use concepts supported by President Clinton. The Presidio serves as a potential model for Homestead AFB and successor base closures and realignments.

WHERE ARE WE NOW

"We are a country ill-equipped for new priorities. Our institutions creak with anachronisms. Many leaders proclaim change but act as if nothing has changed. And we are not preparing the next generation of Americans to understand, much less lead, in a transformed world."⁹

Politically we are in transition. Shifting gears. As Thomas Mann¹⁰ might say, we are about to break the political impasse. Economically you will probably find just as many who believe the outlook is good, as not good. Socially the safety net has holes that need repair. Militarily the United States today is unquestionably the preeminent power on the face of the earth. The future, however, is clouded by decisions now taking shape on what our military force structure will look like in the years ahead.

"The new world is still in its infancy. Events will

surprise us, as is history's habit in times of upheaval."⁹¹

CHANGING OUR WAYS⁹²

Since the 1960's, the President, the Congress, GAO, OMB, CBO, DOD, and local think tank representatives have faulted, to one degree or another, the difficulties associated with closing military bases no longer needed to meet our defense requirements. The process has improved considerably in recent years. Yet, it is also clear much needs to be done to eliminate inefficiency and improve overall effectiveness in DOD's total force structure. The preceding report is a small attempt aimed in that direction.

Politicians, editorials, newspaper articles, TV commentary, and the public mood reflect that change is in the air. Even the most ardent DOD supporter recognizes the pendulum is about to rapidly swing back from defense programs -- and in another, yet undefined direction. Change is much more than a campaign pledge. Our representative form of government is somehow amorously providing definition for the landscape of the future.

The challenge is to change our ways for the better. We must traverse a new landscape and seize the opportunity missed twice before in this century.⁹³ We can achieve a more prosperous America, a safer and freer world, and a more livable planet. We can rebuild our economic base and advance American leadership in the world through collective action. The following passages place the task before us in the context of our time:

"... An old world is collapsing and a new world arising; we have better eyes for the collapse than for the rise, for the old one is the world we know." John Updike.⁹⁴

"The release of atom power," Albert Einstein once noted, "changed everything except our way of thinking." What troubled Einstein troubles us. We have to change our "way of thinking."⁹⁵

EPILOGUE

As this study goes to press, the following unfolding events are noted:

-- Defense Secretary Les Aspin recommended closing 31 installations [including Homestead AFB] and realigning or scaling back 134 others.⁹⁶

-- CJCS General Colin Powell urged BRAC to approve all the requested base cuts.⁹⁷

-- The latest round of base closures, when combined with two earlier ones in 1988 and 1991, will produce annual savings of \$5.6 billion.⁹⁸

-- The news that the Clinton Administration wants to close half of the military bases in the U.S. has sent shock waves throughout every congressional district. It's not the national security that's at stake, but the economies of the towns and cities where the bases are located.⁹⁹

-- The arguments against the closings are hollow. They sound particularly so when they come from members of Congress who have made careers of opposing defense spending.¹⁰⁰

-- Lawmakers look for creative reasons to keep bases open.¹⁰¹

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Homestead

A1

APPENDIX A

1991 BASE CLOSURE DOCUMENTS

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

PRESS RELEASE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MAY 31, 1991
91-164

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COMMISSION STUDIES ADDITIONAL BASES
FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

The Commission today released the names of 36 military installations that are being studied as preliminary candidates for closure or realignment.

"I want to emphasize that this is not a list of closures," said Commission Chairman Jim Courter. "Nor is it a list of recommended realignments. It sets forth a wide array of options. Many of the bases are being studied as alternatives to those already cited in the Pentagon's report. To make informed and independent judgments, we need to compare bases that are slated for closure or realignment with facilities that are not on the Pentagon's list.

"I have said all along that we won't rubber-stamp the Defense Secretary's proposals. And I have cautioned everyone not to assume that their installation is safe just because it is not included in the Pentagon's report.

"The Commission will submit an independent set of recommendations following a fair and open review of all bases that fall into categories of excess capacity.

"Only after further study will the Commission decide whether any of these facilities should be considered candidates for closure or realignment. This issue will be taken up as the first order of business at our June 6 deliberation hearing. The Army Corps of Engineers issue will be discussed at a separate hearing on June 5."

The Commission scheduled deliberation hearings for June 6-7, 13-14 and 17-18.

"At least one Commissioner will visit any installation that becomes a closure candidate, and residents of communities surrounding these installations will have opportunities to testify in public hearings."

The Commission will review the Defense Secretary's list of proposed base closures and realignments and submit to the President its own recommendations no later than July 1. The nonpartisan seven-member panel can add and delete installations.

The President has until July 15 to approve or disapprove the Commission's recommended list, in part or in whole. If he approves the Commission's report, he will send it to Congress, where each house must consider it without amendment. Congress then has 45 days to enact a joint resolution disapproving the Commission's proposed list. Unless it does so, the Commission's recommendations will be adopted and the Secretary of Defense may close those installations.

If the President disapproves the Commission's report, the Commission has until August 15 to submit an independent list of recommendations. If by September 1 the President has not transmitted his approval to Congress, then the realignment process for that year will end.

Attached is the list of possible additions and substitutes to the Pentagon's proposals.

###

ADDITIONAL OPTIONS FOR CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

ARMY

\ Army Corps of Engineers Study for Realign/Closure

Fighting and Maneuver Installations

\ Fort Richardson, AK Study for Closure
\ Fort Drum, NY Study for Closure

Major Training Areas

\ Fort McCoy, WI Study for Closure*
\ Camp Pickett, VA Study for Closure*
\ Fort A.P. Hill, VA Study for Closure*
\ Fort Indiantown Gap, PA Study for Closure*
\ Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico Study for Closure*

Command and Control Installations

\ Fort Hamilton, NY Study for Realign/Closure
\ Fort Totten, NY Study for Realign/Closure

NAVY

Shipyards

\ Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA Study for Closure

Naval Stations

\ Treasure Island Naval Station, CA Study for Realign/Closure

Homeports

\ Staten Island, NY Study for Closure
\ Pascagoula, MS Study for Closure
\ Mobile, AL Study for Closure
\ Everett, WA Study for Closure
\ Ingleside, TX Study for Closure

* Study of these installations focuses on their possible transfer to the Army's reserve component.

Communications and Electronics Repair Facilities

U.S. Marine Corps Barstow, CA	Study for Realignment
NESEC San Diego, CA	Study for Realignment
Naval Depot Jacksonville, FL	Study for Realignment
U.S. Marine Corps Depot Albany, GA	Study for Realignment
Naval Depot Norfolk, VA	Study for Realignment
NESEC Portsmouth, VA	Study for Realignment
Navy Pensacola	Study for Realignment

Air Stations and Training Installations

Meridian Naval Air Station, MS	Study for Closure
Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX	Study for Closure
Agana Naval Air Station, Guam	Study for Closure

Training Installations

Great Lakes Naval Training Ctr., IL	Study for Realign/Closure
San Diego Naval Training Ctr., CA	Study for Realign/Closure
San Diego Marine Recruit Training Depot, CA	Study for Realignment

AIR FORCE

Training Installations

Goodfellow Air Force Base	Study for Closure
---------------------------	-------------------

Flying/Strategic Installations

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY	Study for Closure
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY	Study for Realign/Closure

Flying/Tactical Installations

Homestead Air Force Base, FL	Study for Closure
Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID	Study for Closure
MacDill Air Force Base, FL	Study for Closure

Voting on Additional Bases for Consideration

Installation Name	Motion	Made and Seconded By	C O M M I S S I O N E R S							Final Vote Count
			Hall	Callaway	Cassidy	Chatter	Levitt	Smith	Stuart	
Goodfellow AFB	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Stuart 2-Smith	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	No	Aye	Aye	5-2
Plattsburgh AFB	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Cassidy 2-Callaway	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	5-2
Griffiss AFB	Remove from list of consideration	1-Cassidy 2-Callaway	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	5-2
Homestead AFB, Mountain Home AFB	Remove from list of consideration	1-Cassidy 2-Callaway	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	5-2
MacDill AFB	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Stuart 2-Cassidy	Aye	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	6-1
U.S. Corps of Engineers	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Levitt 2-Stuart	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
Fort Richardson	Remove from list of consideration	1-Ball 2-Cassidy	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye		Aye	6-0

Voting on Additional Bases for Consideration

Installation Name	Motion	Made and Seconded By	C O M M I S S I O N E R S								Final Vote Count
			Hall	Callaway	Cassidy	Coutter	Levitt	Smith	Stuart		
Fort Drum	Remove from list of consideration	1-Ball 2-Stuart	Aye	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	6-1
Forts McCoy, Pickett, AP Hill, Buchanan, Indiantown Gap	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Smith 2-Stuart	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
Fort Hamilton, Fort Totten	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Smith 2-Ball	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
Sacramento Army Depot	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Ball 2-Callaway	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
NSY Long Beach	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Smith 2-Cassidy	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
NAVSTA Treasure Island	Remain on list for further consideration; as a realignment	1-Ball 2-Smith; 1-Ball 2-Levitt	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0

Voting on Additional Bases for Consideration

Installation Name	Motion	Made and Seconded By	C O M M I S S I O N E R S								Final Vote Count
			Hall	Callaway	Cassidy	Courter	Levitt	Smith	Stuart		
Homeports: NAVSTA Ingleside, NAVSTA Everett	Remove from list of consideration	1-Stuart 2-Callaway	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	6-1
NAVSTA New York, Staten Island	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Smith 2-Callaway	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	6-1
NAVSTA Mobile	Remove from list of consideration	1-Cassidy 2-Callaway	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
NAVSTA Pascagoula	Remove from list of consideration	1-Cassidy 2-Callaway	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
NAS Meridian, NAS Kingsville	Remain on list for further consideration	1-Smith 2-Levitt	No	Aye	No	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	5-2

Voting on Additional Bases for Consideration

Installation Name	Motion	Made and Recorded by	C O M M I S S I O N E R S							Final Vote Count
			Ellis	Callaway	Cassidy	Courter	Levitt	Smith	Stuart	
NTC Great Lakes: NTC San Diego and MCRD San Diego	Remove Great Lakes from list of consideration: NTC San Diego and MCRD San Diego remain on list for further consideration	1-Courter 2-Cassidy	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0
NAS Agana, Guam	Remove from list of consideration	1-Courter 2-Levitt	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	Aye	7-0

Homestead


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APPENDIX B

1991 BASE CLOSURE POSITION: HOMESTEAD AFB

US AIR FORCE

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT BRIEFING



COMMISSIONER LEVITT

CONTEXT FOR BASE CLOSURE ACTIONS

THEN - 1988 COMMISSION

- Coherent Soviet/Warsaw Pact Threat
- Constant Force Structure/Manpower
- Slightly Declining DoD Budget
- Commission Sought Efficiencies/
 - Reduce Moderate Excess Capacity
 - Realigned Force Structure
 - Closed Five CONUS Air Force Bases

NOW

- Disintegrated Warsaw Pact
- Reduced Soviet Threat
- DMR
- Rapidly Declining DoD Budget
- Significant Force Structure/
 - Manpower Reductions
 - Significant Excess Capacity
 - Will Close Fifteen CONUS Air Force Bases
- Adjustments to 1988 Commission

LOOKING AHEAD

- Global Reach--Global Power
- Reduced Forward Basing
- Composite Wing
- A-10/ARMY Support
- DESERT STORM
 - Lessons Learned

00000000

THE DILEMMA

- No "obsolete" or "rundown" Air Force bases
- Our bases generally suit current missions
- Relatively good condition
 - Substantial construction or renovation to provide high quality facilities for our people to work and live in
- Community approval and cooperation high at all bases
- We cannot close "bad bases" there are none

APPROVED AND PENDING BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENT'S CONUS Approved Closures

FY 91
Pense

FY 92
Tonopah

FY 93
Chinnuc
George
Mather

FY 94
Norton

FY 95

Overscas Announced Closures


Camp John Hay (W/D)	Comiso (W/D)	Kemble (W/D)	Torrejon (W/D)	Zaragoza	Lindsey
Decinomannu (W/D)	Erlac (W/D)	Sonderstrom (W/D)	Martlesham-	(W/D)	(W/D)
Eskischir (W/D)	Fairford (STBY)	Villasor Sig Area	Heath Com Anx	Up Hyfrd	Lefkas RRL
Goose Bay (W/D)	Gm Com (STBY)	(W/D)	(W/D)	(STBY)	(W/D)
Hellenikon (W/D)	Hess.-Old. (W/D)	Quartu St.			Seuthorpe
Zweibrucken (W/D)	Kwang-Ju (COB)	Elna Hsg Anx			(W/D)
Suwon (COB)	Taegu (COB)	(W/D)			Sembach
Wanna Com Anx (W/D)	Wethersfield (W/D)	Kemble			(P-W/D)
Kapaun Adm Anx (P-W/D)	Estaca de Vares	Fam Hsg			
Tempelhof Airport	(W/D)	(W/D)			
(W/D-starting FY91)	Samsun RRL				
Ahlhorn FOL (W/D)	(W/D)				

Additional CONUS Closures

(Tonopah)	Bergstrom	Grisson	Castle
	Carswell	Loring	
	Enker	Lowry	
	England	MacDill*	
	Myrtle Beach	Moody	
	Williams	Richards-Gebaur	
	Wurtsmith	Rickenbicker	

P-W/D Partial USAF withdrawal
W/D - USAF presence withdrawn
STBY - Base goes to standby status
COB - Base becomes a Collocated
Operating Base
* Partial Closure

AIR FORCE PROCESS



Process

- Considered 107 bases - 86 active, 21 ARC
- Gathered, validated, and applied data
 - Gathered from bases and MAJCOMs
 - Validated by MAJCOMs/Air Staff/Auditor
 - Applied to nearly 80 subelements
- Categorized the bases by mission
 - Support, Training, Flying (Tactical, Strategic, Mobility, Training, Other), Other, and Air Reserve Component

AIR FORCE FORCE STRUCTURE

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	DoD Force Structure Plan 1995	1996	1997
USAFJ/ (PAA)								
Strategic Bombers	268	228	209	171				
Conv Bombers	33	33	33	33				
ICBMs	1000	1000	920	842				
Interceptors (RC)	216	216	216	216				
TFWE (AC) 2/	24.5	22.0	17.1	16.1				
TFWE (RC) 2/	13.4	13.3	13.4	12.3				
Comd/Com/Surv (AC/RC)	180/54	163/54	163/24	165/48				
SOF/Rescue (AC/RC)	102/69	109/71	118/69	140/70				
Tankers (AC/RC)	503/148	493/158	449/188	415/222				
Strat Lift (AC/RC)	288/55	288/55	282/63	267/79				
Tactical Lift (AC/RC)	170/290	170/292	160/277	160/268				

SEE CLASSIFIED ANNEX

1/ This force structure does not include primary training aircraft or aircraft associated with advanced lead-in training for major weapons systems.


2/ Includes tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

PAA - Primary Assigned
AC - Active Component
RC - Reserve Component


Air Force Historical Trends

MANPOWER


Active Military & Civilian



AIRCRAFT INVENTORY TOTAL



MAJOR INSTALLATIONS AIR FORCE



Capacity Analysis

Excess Capacity

Tactical - 5 Bases

Strategic - 6 Bases

Training - 2 Bases

Efficiencies / \$ Savings

ARC - 2 Bases

SUMMARY OF TACTICAL SUBCATEGORY

Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4	Option 5
Priority on Military Value. Emphasis on Readiness & TNG	Priority on Military Value. Emphasis on Readiness & TNG. Downplay Future	Priority on Military Value. Emphasis on Readiness & TNG. Emphasize Future	Priority on Military Value. Emphasis on Cost	Priority on Military Value. Emphasis on Readiness & TNG; Future & Cost
<u>Group 1</u> Eielson Langley Luke Seymour Johnson Tyndall	<u>Group 1</u> Eielson Langley Luke Seymour Johnson Tyndall	<u>Group 1</u> Eielson Langley Seymour Johnson Tyndall	<u>Group 1</u> Eielson Holloman Langley MacDill Seymour Johnson Tyndall	<u>Group 1</u> Eielson Holloman Langley Tyndall
<u>Group 2</u> Cannon Davis-Monthan Holloman Moody Myrtle Beach Shaw	<u>Group 2</u> Cannon Davis-Monthan Holloman Moody Myrtle Beach Shaw	<u>Group 2</u> Cannon Holloman Luke Mountain Home Myrtle Beach Shaw	<u>Group 2</u> Cannon Davis-Monthan Homestead Luke Shaw	<u>Group 2</u> Cannon Davis-Monthan Luke MacDill Mountain Home Seymour Johnson Shaw
<u>Group 3</u> Bergstrom England Homestead MacDill Moody Mountain Home	<u>Group 3</u> Bergstrom England Homestead MacDill Mountain Home	<u>Group 3</u> Bergstrom Davis-Monthan England Homestead MacDill Moody	<u>Group 3</u> Bergstrom England Moody Mountain Home Myrtle Beach	<u>Group 3</u> Bergstrom ♦ England ♦ Homestead (MacDill-partial closure) ♦ Moody ♦ Myrtle Beach ♦

♦ Closure
* Partial Closure/Realignment - Does not exceed Title 10, USC 2687 threshold

FLYING CATEGORY TACTICAL SUBCATEGORY

Summary of Tactical Bases

Option 5: Priority on military value, with emphasis on readiness and training, future and cost.

CRITERIA	I	II	III	IV	COST/NPV(\$M)	V	ROI	VI	VII	VIII
BERGSTROM AFB	Y-	R+	Y	Y	155.7/187	2	2	Y	G	Y
CANNON AFB	G-	G-	Y-	59.0/297	1	1	1	G-	G-	Y+
D-MONTHAN AFB	Y+	Y+	Y	45.1/228	1	1	1	G-	G-	Y
EIELSON AFB	G	G-	Y+	139.6/492	1	1	1	G	G-	Y-
ENGLAND AFB	Y+	G-	Y	43.3/348	1	1	1	G-	G	G
HOLLOMAN AFB	Y	G	Y+	280.3/211	2	2	2	G-	G-	Y+
HOMESTEAD AFB	Y	Y-	G-	98.4/259	1	1	1	Y	G-	Y
LANGLEY AFB	G	Y	G-	203.4/190	5	5	5	G-	G	Y+
LUKE AFB	G	G-	Y-	89.3/447	2	2	2	Y	G	Y+
MacDILL AFB	Y	Y-	Y	220.2/252	4*	4*	4*	Y	G	Y+
MOODY AFB	Y	Y	G-	28.8/260	1	1	1	G-	G-	G-
MT HOME AFB	Y+	Y+	Y+	53.2/335	1	1	1	G	Y+	Y
MYR BEACH AFB	G+	Y	Y	41.3/227	1	1	1	G-	G-	G-
SEY JOHNSON AFB	G	Y-	G	109.1/252	3	3	3	G-	Y+	G-
SHAW AFB	G-	Y-	Y	78.0/358	1	1	1	G	Y+	Y
TYNDALL AFB	G	Y+	G-	280.6/141	7	7	7	G-	G-	Y+

* Partial closure option.

COST/NPV(\$M)
29.0/128

ROI
1

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 1988 BCC

Chanute AFB

- Air Force authority to contract fire training if cost effective, vice realign to Goodfellow AFB (MILCON Avoidance-TBD)
- Fuels Training courses will realign to Sheppard AFB vice Goodfellow AFB (\$2.6M)
- Lowry AFB closes, will not receive the 45 courses from Chanute (\$20.8M)

George AFB

- F-4Gs retire (interim realign to ARC) (\$88.2M)
- EC-130Hs stay at Davis-Monthan AFB vice Bergstrom AFB (\$9.7M)
- EF-111 realign to Cannon AFB vice stay at Mt Home AFB \$25M
- Mt Home AFB becomes composite wing \$52.6M

Mather AFB


- 940th ARG (AFRES) moves to McClellan AFB vice staying at Mather AFB \$22.5M
- Hospital stays open at Mather AFB as an annex to McClellan AFB (\$32M)
- UNT relocates to Randolph AFB vice Beale AFB (\$31.5M)

Norton AFB

- AFMA will relocate 45 manpower authorizations to NCR vice March AFB

NET MILCON SAVINGS (\$84.7)

APPROVED & PROPOSED CLOSURES & REALIGNMENTS




AIR FORCE TEAM
HOMESTEAD AFB

- 0 RATIONALE FOR INCLUSION
 - 00 LOW RANKING BY AIR FORCE
- 0 RATIONALE FOR DELETION
 - 00 FACTORS UNDERLYING AIR FORCE EXCLUSION DECISION
 - 000 PROXIMITY TO CUBA
 - 000 GUARD ALERT DETACHMENT
 - 000 HOWARD CLOSURE-USOUTHCOM SUPPORT
 - 00 OTHER AGENCY SUPPORT (CUSTOMS, DEA, IAAFA, AND ARMY GUARD)
 - 00 AIR TO AIR TRAINING CAPABILITIES
 - 00 CLOSURE CHALLENGES AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP'S MILITARY JUDGMENT
 - 00 HOME OF AIR FORCE CONFERENCE CENTER

JUNE 13, VL

FLYING--TACTICAL

EIELSON



TACTICAL CATEGORY

BASE	CRITERIA							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
BERGSTROM	Y-	R+	Y	55.1	2	Y	G	Y
ENGLAND	Y+	G-	Y	43.3	1	G-	G	G-
MOODY	Y	Y	G-	28.0	1	G-	G-	G-
MYRTLE BEACH	G-	Y	Y+	41.3	1	G-	G-	G+
MACDILL	Y	Y-	Y	220.2	4	Y	G	Y+
HOMESTEAD	Y	Y-	G-	98.4	1	Y	G-	Y
MT HOME	Y+	Y+	Y+	53.2	11	G	Y+	Y
CANNON	G-	G-	Y-	59.0	1	G-	G-	Y+
DAVIS MONTHAN	Y+	Y+	Y	45.1	1	G-	G	Y
LUKE	G	G-	Y-	89.3	2	Y	G	Y+
SEY-JOHNSON	G	Y-	G	109.1	3	G-	Y+	G-
SHAW	G-	Y-	Y	78.0	1	G	Y+	Y

1 All right. Let's move on to Homestead, Mountain
2 Home and MacDill. Could we have Staff refresh our
3 recollections?

4 MR. LAMONT: Let's start with Homestead, 510.
5 Again, the Commission will recall that the Air Force did rank
6 Homestead in their process; and, in their process and in ours,
7 the Staff went through it. Homestead did come out low. There
8 was a decision by the Air Force leadership to delete Homestead
9 from the list.

10 The factors underlying that are listed there for
11 you: its proximity to Cuba; it does have a guard alert
12 detachment; its increased role, as far as South American with
13 the impending closure of Howard in the Canal Zone. Homestead
14 Air Force Base also does support a number of other agencies.
15 Their outstanding training facilities for air to air. It is a
16 little more difficult for those crews to get to Avon Park--
17 the air to ground range -- but it is possible to get there.

18 As a side note, the Air Force provided us the
19 additional point that it is the home of the Air Force
20 Conference Center, which is an additional expense. It has to
21 be put somewhere.

22 Did you want to go through all three of them at

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JUNE 7, 1991
BRAC TESTIMONY

once?

CHAIRMAN COURTER: Yes.

MR. LAMONT: Mountain Home Air Force Base, the slide on your right, did come out low closure costs, and its present utilization is low. It just has the F-111s there at the current time. The Staff review --

CHAIRMAN COURTER: You are on Mountain Home right now?

MR. LAMONT: Mountain Home, yes. The Staff review highlighted the positive aspects of the future potential. It is planned as the Air Force -- The future potential is both in air space and the range complex that the Idaho is now building. It is planned to be the home of the first full composite wing; and, quite frankly, it is unlikely to close. It is more than likely to become a guard base if the Commission elects to close it, just by virtue of its location and the facilities and range and air space around Mountain Home.

Look at MacDill, the total closure at MacDill. You get less savings if all you do is a partial realignment. It still requires almost 2,000 Air Force personnel there. The Air Force recommended realignment strictly on a cost basis. I

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1 believe the total cost is \$220 million, and that is the
2 rationale for deleting it, is the fact that it is costly to
3 carry out a full closure. A location has not been found for
4 those joint headquarters.

5 I might also add just a personal note. The issue of
6 moving those joint headquarters would add a question as the
7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs goes through his CINC
8 reorganization, whether the Centcom Command will come out of
9 that process still as a command is at issue, so we are moving
10 the headquarters, so that you don't know whether it is going
11 to be there forever and incurring that cost.

12 The last point is on the slide, only as a reflection
13 of the fact that there is a synergism with Tampa Bay, and
14 CHAMPUS is one of those costs. If we close MacDill, you do
15 cause an additional burden on the retired; the CHAMPUS costs,
16 the hospital costs that we have spoken of before.

17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Let me make the comments, and
18 then we will have an open discussion and entertain a motion at
19 any time.

20 On Homestead Air Force Base in Florida, I am
21 personally convinced that there is an important strategic and
22 classified need for the foreseeable future in maintaining that

1 as a facility, and I see no reason why we should further
2 consider it. That is based on both classified and
3 unclassified information that we have received in the past,
4 and the classified information yesterday.

5 On Mountain Home, if anybody is interested, my
6 comments on that is that that as well should be removed from
7 further action by our Commission, based on the good work with
8 respect to the composite wing aspects. It is clearly,
9 although we have had them before in the past, not as ambitious
10 as this; and I understand -- and Duane Cassidy knows a lot
11 more about it than I do and Will Ball and others, but the
12 target ranges are magnificent in that area, and the pilots
13 therefore love it. They want to be the best trained in the
14 world, for obvious reasons, and they speak very highly of that
15 facility because of the collocation of different types of
16 ranges that are accessible.

17 My comments on MacDill is that it is on the Pentagon
18 list for realignment. We added it for prospective closure,
19 and I am going to be going there I think on Monday. I would
20 like it to be voted on -- Well, it is just my opinion, I think
21 we should defer further action, so our options are open as to
22 whether it should be a real reduction or closure.

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1 COMMISSIONER BALL: Mr. Chairman, this was -- This
2 of course came about the Commission being disadvantaged
3 procedurally, which there is nothing we can do about it. But
4 since we have begun to examine the TAC bases that are on the
5 list and we have not had the opportunity to examine all the
6 TAC bases that are not on the list, the comments Commissioner
7 Smith made pursuant to his visit to England Air Force Base,
8 together with my own observations after my visit to Moody Air
9 Force Base. Commissioner Stuart is scheduled to visit Myrtle
10 Beach Air Force Base I believe next week.

11 My conclusions thus far of the Tactical Air
12 Command's rationale on certain aspects of the ranking getting
13 down into the subelements of our detailed analysis, contain
14 some areas subject to a dispute; such things as grading the
15 impact of ranges and weather and the conclusion as to which
16 TAC base was better suited for training in operations. So, my
17 judgment is those questions have not yet been resolved; that
18 within the Tactical Air Command and the ranking of TAC bases,
19 I don't think the case in my judgment has been made
20 conclusively that the bases chosen for closure were chosen for
21 the right reason, or that some of the factors which may be in
22 dispute would not have altered the ranking of bases. And I

1 certainly think at this point, that is the case with Moody,
2 and I think the argument we discussed yesterday with respect
3 to England and the Fort Polk issue are very material to our
4 investigation.

5 So, once again, the issue becomes, as we await the
6 outcome of that analysis, we are having to up front here make
7 a decision as to whether alternative bases should be further
8 investigated. I certainly don't want to, like all
9 Commissioners, cause any unnecessary anxiety to those
10 communities that would be affected. But frankly, as we were
11 just discussing on the Plattsburgh and Griffis issue, without
12 the generation of some level of anxiety, the Commission will
13 be constrained as to what alternatives we can explore, and we
14 will thereby be accepting in this case the analysis of TAC and
15 the ranking of TAC bases without alternatives.

16 So, it is my judgment that maximum flexibility here
17 should be maintained, and eliminate all three of these bases.
18 We eliminate two of them. Our flexibility as we address the
19 TAC situation becomes more constrained in the next phase.

20 I would ask the Staff when they think we might have
21 the benefit of all the material that we require from the Air
22 Force and from the Tactical Air Command that addresses itself

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1 to these outstanding questions that we raised yesterday?

2 MR. LAMONT: I think we will have that written
3 documentation for you during the next week. It is not going
4 to go more than a week. We will have it the early part of
5 next week.

6 MR. BEHRMANN: We will be prepared to address those
7 questions at our next meeting next week, Mr. Ball.

8 COMMISSIONER CALLAWAY: Mr. Chairman, I think
9 obviously if we have some real reasons to wait, I guess we
10 have to do it. But in the case of -- As you look at the TRC
11 bases, everywhere I looked, the one that kept coming up is
12 Homestead. That is the one that you compare, and that is what
13 you look at.

14 Now, I am convinced that the Secretary of the Air
15 Force has legitimate strategic reason, which we have been
16 briefed on in classified briefing, for keeping Homestead open.
17 And, because of that, I am saying for my personal vote that is
18 fenced off and we can't look at that. If others agree with
19 that, I think the thing for us to do is take it off the list,
20 get those people to understand they are not in harm's way, and
21 proceed.

22 On the other hand, Mountain Home, I just hear so

1 many good things about Mountain Home and the training and all
2 that, and I don't perceive it is going to swap for any of the
3 others. I think as you mentioned others like Moody and places
4 like that, I think we still have to look and see if they stand
5 on their own, see if they have deviated substantially from the
6 criteria. And we may well decide that one of those that is on
7 the list should come off. But I would have a hard time
8 believing it is Mountain Home, from everything that I have
9 heard about that particular Air Force Base. It does have very
10 unique capabilities that we would want to keep, and that is
11 the reason I am voting now, understanding the points that
12 Commissioner Ball made are very correct points, but I don't
13 see there is a high enough likelihood of that to keep the
14 turmoil going, myself.

15 COMMISSIONER STUART: Mr. Chairman, I associate
16 myself with Commissioner Callaway's comments.

17 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Jim Smith, any discussion?

18 COMMISSIONER SMITH: Mr. Chairman, the only
19 discussion I have I guess would go back to Homestead. In some
20 other discussion with Commissioner Cassidy, he almost
21 persuaded me that Homestead ought to be on the list. And we
22 seem to have put a lot of credence in what we heard last

1 night.

2 I, for one, am not convinced as Commissioner
3 Callaway is, that there are good, cogent, strategic reasons to
4 leave Homestead on. We have managed to take out a pretty good
5 military force halfway around the world, and if we are worried
6 about the military might in that part of the world, I think
7 that -- I am not convinced, frankly. They are a long way from
8 any green suits that they might support, and I think they
9 deserve a good look.

10 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Any other discussion? I will
11 call Duane Cassidy's motion. I will restate the motion. The
12 motion reflects two bases. The motion is to remove from
13 further action Homestead Air Force Base and Mountain Home Air
14 Force Base.

15 We will start out with Duane Cassidy.

16 COMMISSIONER CASSIDY: Yes.

17 COMMISSIONER LEVITT: Yes.

18 COMMISSIONER CALLAWAY: Aye.

19 CHAIRMAN COURTER: Aye.

20 COMMISSIONER BALL: No.

21 COMMISSIONER STUART: Aye.

22 COMMISSIONER SMITH: No.

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BASES ADDED TO THE PENTAGON'S LIST

Major Training Area

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------|
| 1. Ft. McCoy, Wisconsin | Closure |
| 2. Camp Pickett, Virginia | Closure |
| 3. Ft. A.P. Hill, Virginia | Closure |
| 4. Ft. Buchanan, Puerto Rico | Closure |
| 5. Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania | Closure |

Command and Control Installations

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|
| 6. Ft. Hamilton, New York | Realignment |
| 7. Ft. Totten, New York | Realignment |

Shipyards

- | | |
|------------------------------------------|---------|
| 8. Long Beach Naval Shipyard, California | Closure |
|------------------------------------------|---------|

Naval Stations

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 9. Treasure Island Naval Stn., California | Realignment/Closure |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------|

Homeport

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------|
| 10. Staten Island, New York | Closure |
|-----------------------------|---------|

Air Stations and Training Facilities

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------|---------|
| 11. Meridian Naval Air Station, Mississippi | Closure |
| 12. Kingsville Naval Air Station, Texas | Closure |

Training Installations

- | | |
|------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| 13. San Diego Nvl. Trg. Ctr., California | Realignment/Closure |
| 14. SD Mar. Rct. Trg. Dpt., California | Realignment/Closure |

Training Installations

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------|
| 15. Goodfellow AFB, Texas | Closure |
|---------------------------|---------|

Flying /Strategic Installations

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| 16. Plattsburgh AFB, New York | Closure |
|-------------------------------|---------|

Flying/Tactical Installations

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------|
| 17. MacDill AFB, Florida | Closure |
|--------------------------|---------|

* AS A RESULT OF JUNE 7, 1991 VOTING

Homestead

C1

APPENDIX C

ICAF SURVEY

RESEARCH PROJECT SURVEY - HOMESTEAD AFB

As part of the ICAF community, your personal opinion on the future of Homestead AFB ("Homestead") is important to my research. Please take a few minutes to carefully read this survey and give me your feedback. After you have circled your answers, place the completed survey in the "SURVEY" box at the rear of the mailroom. Thank you for your help.

BACKGROUND: On August 24, Hurricane Andrew hit S. Florida causing billions of dollars in damage, enormous human suffering and dislocation. In the aftermath, Homestead AFB was destroyed. Shortly thereafter, the President visited the devastated area and pledged to rebuild S. Florida, including Homestead. Debate in the Congress and the press questioned the wisdom of rebuilding the AFB: Questions were raised whether the decision was election-year politics, but not good public policy. Others countered that Homestead was of significant military value. JCS Colin Powell is quoted as saying, "The correct decision has been made to rebuild it." 1/ The rebuilding cost estimates range from \$850 million to \$1 billion. The President requested \$480.6 million in emergency funds; however, Congress appropriated only \$92 million. The rebuilding issue is yet to be decided.

MILITARY-STRATEGIC DATA: In 1991, the Defense Base Closure Commission identified Homestead as a preliminary candidate for closure. Although ranked low, the Air Force testified that Homestead had significant military value: (1) its close proximity to Cuba; (2) it has a guard alert detachment; (3) its increased role due to the pending closure of Howard in the Canal Zone; (4) its a outstanding training facility. The Commission voted 5 to 2 on June 1, 1991 to remove Homestead from its preliminary study for closure listing.

1/ The Washington Post, 9/11/62, p.A3.

PLEASE READ THE STATEMENTS CAREFULLY
AND CIRCLE YOUR ANSWER.

Strongly Agree	SA
Agree	A
Neutral/Uncertain	N
Disagree	D
Strongly Disagree	SD

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|---|---|---|----|
| 1. Sufficient military justification exists to rebuild Homestead AFB. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 2. Homestead AFB' functions should be permanently reassigned to other installations. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 3. It makes no sense militarily to rebuild Homestead AFB. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 4. Non-military social and economic factors (drug interdiction; local economy) should be an important criteria for deciding whether to rebuild Homestead AFB. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 5. The funds needed to rebuild Homestead AFB can be used more effectively to meet other priority military needs. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 6. National interests will be served by converting Homestead to civilian use. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 7. Politics should stay out of the decision-making process on the future of Homestead AFB. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 8. The President's decision to rebuild Homestead AFB is an election-eve maneuver to get Florida votes. | SA | A | N | D | SD |
| 9. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate your overall opinion as to whether Homestead should be rebuilt: | | | | | |

	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
	REBUILD							DON'T REBUILD		

10 Please circle your status:

AIR FORCE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE	RESERVE	GUARD	CIVILIAN	OTHER

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey.

ICAF RESPONSES TO HOMESTEAD AFB QUESTIONNAIRE


RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF RESPONSES

Statement	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral/ Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Sufficient military justification exists to rebuild Homestead AFB.	4 %	16 %	18 %	39 %	23 %
2. Homestead AFB' functions should be permanently reassigned to other installations.	28	44	14	11	3
3. It makes no sense militarily to rebuild Homestead AFB.	20	39	18	18	5
4. Non-military social and economic factors (drug interdiction; local economy) should be an important criteria for deciding whether to rebuild Homestead AFB.	5	27	7	45	16
5. The funds needed to rebuild Homestead AFB can be used more effectively to meet other priority military needs.	35	41	16	6	2
6. National interests will be served by converting Homestead to civilian use.	6	39	36	14	5
7. Politics should stay out of the decision-making process on the future of Homestead AFB.	32	33	9	17	9
8. The President's decision to rebuild Homestead AFB is an election-eve maneuver to get Florida votes.	31	45	17	4	3

OTHER DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Number of Responses	137
Mean Score	5.211679
Median Score	6
Minimum/Maximum Score Possible	-16/ + 16
Standard Deviation	5.766831

HISTOGRAM OF LIKERT SCORES



**ICAF RESPONSES TO HOMESTEAD AFB QUESTIONNAIRE
LIKERT SCORES**

Statement No.	Score
1	-.6058
2	.8175
3	.5036
4	-.4161
5	.9781
6	.2555
7	.6277
8	.9854

Scoring Scale: + 2 = Strongly Agree + 1 = Agree
 0 = Neutral or Uncertain
 -1 = Disagree -2 = Strongly Disagree

Summation Question: On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate
your overall opinion as to whether Homestead should
be rebuilt: (10 Rebuild - - - 1 Don't Rebuild)

ANSWER: 2.2043796 (Don't Rebuild)

DATAFILE

Sample Name = ICAF

1: -14	2: -10	3: -8	4: -6	5: -6	6: -6
7: -6	8: -5	9: -5	10: -5	11: -4	12: -4
13: -4	14: -3	15: -3	16: -3	17: -3	18: -3
19: -2	20: -1	21: -1	22: -1	23: -1	24: 0
25: 0	26: 0	27: 0	28: 0	29: 0	30: 1
31: 2	32: 2	33: 2	34: 2	35: 2	36: 2
37: 2	38: 3	39: 3	40: 3	41: 3	42: 3
43: 3	44: 4	45: 4	46: 4	47: 4	48: 4
49: 4	50: 4	51: 4	52: 4	53: 4	54: 4
55: 5	56: 5	57: 5	58: 5	59: 5	60: 5
61: 5	62: 5	63: 6	64: 6	65: 6	66: 6
67: 6	68: 6	69: 6	70: 6	71: 6	72: 6
73: 6	74: 7	75: 7	76: 7	77: 7	78: 7
79: 7	80: 7	81: 7	82: 7	83: 7	84: 7
85: 7	86: 7	87: 8	88: 8	89: 8	90: 8
91: 8	92: 8	93: 8	94: 8	95: 8	96: 8
97: 9	98: 9	99: 9	100: 9	101: 9	102: 9
103: 9	104: 9	105: 9	106: 9	107: 10	108: 10
109: 10	110: 10	111: 10	112: 10	113: 10	114: 11
115: 11	116: 11	117: 11	118: 11	119: 11	120: 11
121: 11	122: 12	123: 12	124: 12	125: 13	126: 13
127: 13	128: 13	129: 14	130: 14	131: 14	132: 14
133: 15	134: 15	135: 16	136: 16	137: 10	

TOTAL = 137

MEAN = 5.211679

MEDIAN = 6

STANDARD DEVIATION = 5.766831

Homestead

D1

APPENDIX D

DEPOT MAINTENANCE CONSOLIDATION STUDY DOCUMENTS



THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

CM-1566-93
22 January 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Depot Consolidation Study

1. In a 3 December 1992 DepSecDef memorandum, the Services were directed to prepare integrated proposals, with cross-Service inputs, to streamline depot maintenance activities. The memorandum was sent after preliminary Depot Consolidation Study results identified 25-50 percent more capacity than we need and found that unnecessary duplication exists throughout the depot system.
2. The Service Secretaries' 15 January 1993 response concluded that seven to eight depot-equivalents could be closed. This number of potential closures is consistent with one of the lesser options of the Consolidation Study for downsizing within Service boundaries, but significantly less than expected with increased levels of depot interservicing. The Services' memorandum committed to address before 3 February 1993 the duplication in ground equipment maintenance between the Marine Corps and Army, and the duplication in helicopter maintenance between the Navy and the Army. The memorandum does not address fixed-wing aviation, the area with the greatest additional savings potential.
3. It is important that we focus our future depot maintenance resources upon the most cost-effective mix of facilities. To do this, we must eliminate not only excess capacity, but also unnecessary duplication. We must do both in time to meet the 1993 BRAC window. The Services' response falls short of doing what is required.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM					
TO CJCS		CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		ACTION NUMBER	
THRU VCJCS DJS				ORIG SUSPENSE	
SUBJECT CJCS Response to SECDEF Regarding the Services' Depot Maintenance Consolidation Inputs to BRAC-93				ACTION	
				APPROVAL	
				X SIGNATURE	
				J SUSPENSE	
INFORMATION					
ACTION SUMMARY					
<p>1. Purpose. To provide a CJCS-requested response (TAB A) to SECDEF regarding the Services' Depot Maintenance Consolidation inputs to the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC-93).</p> <p>2. Background</p> <p>a. On 3 December 1992, DEPSECDEF directed the Services to prepare integrated BRAC proposals, with cross-service inputs, to streamline depot maintenance activities (TAB B).</p> <p>b. In the Services' response (TAB C) they identified seven to eight "depot equivalents" for closure. The downsizing has been within Service boundaries and consistent with the Depot Consolidation Study option for downsizing with no increased level of interservicing.</p> <p>c. The Service Secretaries' memorandum commits to a 3 February 1993 response on ground equipment duplication between the Marines and Army and helicopter duplication between the Army and Navy. The memorandum is silent on fixed wing aviation duplication because of disagreement between the Navy and the Air Force. Informal information indicates that there has been no movement or accommodation and little likelihood of achieving anything more by the 3 February date.</p> <p>d. A comparison of the savings potential available from increased interservicing is presented TAB D.</p>					
COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE Col Thomas B. Slade, USAF, J-4/SCAD, 5-9212					
DATE PREPARED 22 January 1993		CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		Classified by Declassify on	

3. Discussion

a. In our judgment, the Services will not voluntarily agree to any significant increases in interservicing, either in ground systems or fixed wing aviation. As a result, we will miss the opportunity to close some excess facilities via BRAC-93 and be forced to accept higher costs of doing business until decisions from BRAC-95, if it occurs, are implemented.

b. The DEPSECDEF guidance (TAB A) stated that the Services' integrated proposals should be prepared in coordination with CJCS and USD(A). Proposed CJCS memorandum to SECDEF places the CJCS on record stating that the Services' inputs are insufficient.

c. Proposed CJCS memorandum addresses only the duplication of maintenance capability and is consistent with the latest Roles and Missions report changes.

4. Recommendation. CJCS sign memorandum at TAB A.

Attachments

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

TO CJCS	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	ACTION NUMBER J-4 2563/979-00	
THRU VCJCS DJS			ORIG SUSPENSE
SUBJECT Chairman's Day Book - Meeting with Lt Gen Mears, J-4, Re: Depot Maintenance Consolidation (Depot Command), 0915-0945, 22 Jan 93		ACTION	
		APPROVAL	
		SIGNATURE	
		X	INFORMATION

ACTION SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To provide CJCS requested* background information prior to his 0915-0945, 22 January 1993 meeting with Lt Gen Mears.
2. Background
 - a. In response to DEPSECDEF direction (TAB A), Services have reviewed their depot maintenance capacity.
 - b. The Air Force was unsuccessful in coordinating a joint memorandum which committed the Services to an Executive Agent arrangement (TAB B).
 - c. The final, signed memorandum (TAB C) identifies eight "depot equivalents" for closure. This is consistent with the results from the Depot Consolidation Study for the consolidation option within Service boundaries. No increased level of interservicing is assumed in the Service effort although the joint memorandum commits to looking at increased interservicing in ground systems and in rotary wing aviation.
3. Discussion. The Air Force and Navy are at an impasse on any increased level of interservicing in fixed wing aviation. This is the area of greatest excess capacity and additional savings potential.
4. Recommendation. None. Provided for information only.

Attachments

Reference:

* SJS 2563/979-00

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
J-4					

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE Col Thomas B. Slade, USAF, SCAD, 5-9212

DATE PREPARED 11 January 1993	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	Classified by Declassify on
----------------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------

Office of the Secretary
of the Navy
1051 Navy Pentagon
Washington DC 20350-1051

Office of the Secretary
of the Army
202 Army Pentagon
Washington DC 20310-0202

Office of the Secretary
of the Air Force
1670 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1670

JAN 15 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of
Streamlining of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities -
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

In accordance with your December 3, 1992 Memorandum, our Departments have aggressively reviewed their depot maintenance capacity. Our initial review of 30 depots identified substantial depot capacity reduction opportunities. To illustrate, over nine million direct labor hours (DLH) are excess to ground systems and equipment depot maintenance requirements, suggesting the equivalent of two ground systems depots could be closed. Likewise, excess shipyard workyear capacity indicates we have one to two depot nuclear shipyard equivalents excess to projected requirements. Finally, over 14.6 million DLH are excess to aviation depot requirements: 3 million DLH in rotary wing and 11.6 million DLH in fixed wing. These numbers suggest four aviation depot equivalents could be closed. Combined, the results of this unprecedented effort indicate seven to eight depot equivalents could be closed.


The excess capacity outlined above is being addressed by each Department's BRAC 93 process between now and February 3. This effort will identify depots which could be closed to eliminate the organic excess capacity. With the prudence necessary to avoid contaminating the BRAC process, we have started interservice reviews to optimize our depot capacity. In particular, the rotary wing and ground systems/equipment categories lend themselves to multi-service review. In the rotary wing case, a choice of servicing depot probably should be considered between the Army's and Navy's existing depots. In the ground systems area, while the Army should identify closure candidates, the Army and the Marine Corps, with support from the Air Force and the Navy, should together determine if workload reallocations would lead to a better final decision.

The process described above should be thought of as the first step. This could pave the way for continued consideration of a new management scheme for DoD-wide depot maintenance

activities. These new management processes would then spend the next two years working competition, workload reassignment opportunities, and capacity refinement, preparatory to a final round of closure reviews for the 1995 commission. By February 15 we plan to have realistic and attainable depot reduction candidates as part of our final response to your December 3 memorandum--in concert with our goal of providing BRAC inputs to the Secretary of Defense on February 22, 1993.



SEAN O'KEEFE
Secretary of the Navy



MICHAEL P. W. STONE
Secretary of the Army



DONALD B. RICE
Secretary of the Air Force

cc: USD(A)
CJCS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

JOINT MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of
Streamlining of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities -
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

In accordance with your December 3, 1992 Memorandum, our Departments have aggressively reviewed their depot maintenance capacity. Our initial review of 30 depots identified substantial depot capacity reduction opportunities. To illustrate, over nine million direct labor hours (DLH) are excess to ground systems and equipment depot maintenance requirements, suggesting the equivalent of two ground systems depots could be closed. Likewise, excess shipyard workyear capacity indicates we have one to two depot nuclear shipyard equivalents excess to projected requirements. Finally, over 14.6 million DLH are excess to aviation depot requirements: 3 million DLH in rotary wing and 11.6 million DLH in fixed wing. These numbers suggest four aviation depot equivalents could be closed. Combined, the results of this unprecedented effort indicate seven to eight depot equivalents could be closed.

The excess capacity outlined above is being addressed by each Department's BRAC 93 process between now and February 3. This effort will identify depots which could be closed to eliminate the organic excess capacity where it resides. Simultaneously, but with the prudence necessary to avoid contaminating the BRAC process, we have started interservice reviews to optimize our depot capacity. In particular, the rotary wing and ground systems/equipment categories lend themselves to multi-service review. In the rotary wing case, a choice of servicing depot probably should be made between the Army's & Navy's existing depots. In the ground systems area, while the Army should identify two closure candidates, the Army and the Marine Corps should together determine if workload reallocations would lead to a better final decision.

The process described above should be thought of as the first step, to be followed by establishment of Service Executive Agent assignments by category with joint management arrangements for each one. These new management processes would then spend the next two years working competition, workload reassignment opportunities, and capacity refinement, preparatory to a final round of closure reviews for the 1995 commission. By February 15 we plan to have realistic and attainable depot reduction candidates as part of our final response to your December 3 memorandum--in concert with our goal of providing BRAC inputs to the Secretary of Defense on February 22, 1993.

DONALD B. RICE
Secretary
of the Air Force

SEAN O'KEEFE
Secretary
of the Navy

MICHAEL P. W. STONE
Secretary
of the Army

cc: USD(A)
CJCS

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

TO CJCS	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	ACTION NUMBER	
HRU VCJCS DJS		ORIG SUSPENSE	
SUBJECT Depot Maintenance Consolidation Status		ACTION	
		APPROVAL	
		SIGNATURE	
		X INFORMATION	
		SJS SUSPENSE	
		J SUSPENSE	

ACTION SUMMARY

1. Purpose. To provide CJCS current status on depot maintenance consolidation issues.

2. Background

a. The Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study should be in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by the end of January 1993. GSA will announce in the Federal Register the establishment of the group concurrent with the notice of a public meeting to be held on 26 January 1993. Following this meeting, the study will be forwarded to the CJCS in final form.

b. The study recommended the following actions:

1) The Services coordinate and integrate that portion of their submission to the Federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission that pertains to depot maintenance facilities.

2) A Joint Depot Maintenance Command be established.

c. Although the study has not been formally released, the DEPSECDEF has directed (TAB A) the Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the CJCS and the USD(A), to prepare integrated proposals, with cross-Service inputs, to streamline depot maintenance for submission to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. This was the first recommendation of the study.

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
J-4		77000			

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE CDR Jim Barrett, SC, USN, SCAD/J-4 5-9234

DATE PREPARED 8 January 1993	CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	Classified by Declassify on
---------------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------

3. Discussion

a. Service Chiefs and Secretaries met on 6 January 1993 to jointly review their integrated proposals. The Joint Staff and OSD were not invited.

b. The Services are attempting to coordinate a memorandum outlining their consolidation efforts (TAB B). It suggests:

1) Army and Air Force have reached an accommodation on ground systems and rotary wing aircraft. This has been expected.

2) Air Force and Navy remain at an impasse on fixed wing aviation. This is the area where major additional savings and closures could be realized if an increased level of interservicing was conducted. It appears that breaking the impasse will occur only by direct negotiations between SECAF and SECNAV.

3) If the Services can agree on the approach described in the memorandum, seven to eight depot equivalents could be closed as the result of the current integrated efforts. This is almost identical to the Depot Consolidation Study results when consolidation efforts were limited to within Service boundaries.

4) Service Executive Agent assignments be established by category followed by two years of review to make further depot closure recommendations. This was not the optimum recommendation of the study's Executive Working Group.

c. The closure of seven to eight depots would represent a twenty-three to twenty-six percent reduction of the Services' depots. The memorandum also suggests a further look at depot closure after the executive Service assignments have an opportunity to accomplish more interservicing. If successful, the study demonstrated that an additional two to three depots may be closed, and potential savings could be increased by as much as thirty-seven percent (the study's relative savings increased from \$6.7B to \$9.2B). TAB C illustrates the impact of interservicing.

4. Conclusions

a. It is not clear how and when, or if the Services will coordinate their proposal with CJCS. If offered the opportunity to comment, we would take issue with any proposed submission which did not include substantial interservicing, especially for fixed wing aircraft.

b. Without movement on fixed wing aviation interservicing, the collective submissions from the Services will yield few additional savings over separate submissions (closure of 7-8 depots equivalents).

c. Not optimizing interservicing across Service lines now will defer, for at least two years, an opportunity to close all the facilities we do not need.

d. By submitting a coordinated submission to the Federal Base Closure and Realignment Commission the Services are fulfilling the first recommendation of the study. It appears that the benefits of interservicing will not be incorporated in this go-around and we will lose an opportunity to obtain the additional savings until 1995. The joint memorandum's recommendation to establish Service Executive Agents, although not the study's recommended organization, is driven by the same need that the study's second recommendation addressed -- the need to empower a single commander with the authority and responsibility to eliminate depot inefficiencies across Service lines. The executive agent arrangement would only be a step in that direction.

e. Even with a signed memorandum, a future decision will be required on the study's second recommendation, the formation of a depot maintenance organization. We will make a recommendation to CJCS after FACA compliance is obtained.

5. Recommendation. None. Provided for information only.

Attachments



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



MEMORANDUM FOR DCS/LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 22 DEC 1992
DCNO/LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
DCS/I&L, HQ UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of
Streamlining of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities -
ACTION MEMORANDUM

As a result of the 15 Dec multi-Service meeting concerning the 3 Dec DEPSECDEF memo, the Services agreed on the data and format all would use in submitting information to each Lead Service. Capacity calculations should be based on a one shift, eight hour a day, five day per week schedule. Capacity index and throughput for FY 91 will be displayed by the appropriate JADMAG work breakdown structure (WBS) in direct labor hours for each of the three categories in Secretary Atwood's memo. Service depot total budgeted workload will be shown by WBS for FY 1994-1999. This anticipated workload should not reflect more than 60 percent of the total available workload reflected in the FY 1994-1999 budget program through PBD status as of 21 December 1992.

Inputs are due to the respective Lead Service by 31 Dec 92. Lead Services will consolidate and coordinate these inputs with all Services involved to ensure no DOD-wide loss of any particular depot maintenance capability. If warranted, Lead Service inputs should include comments on excess depot capacity by WBS and Service only.

Lead Service inputs will be briefed/forwarded to the three Department Secretaries on 6 Jan 93. Subsequently, the Air Force will provide a cover memo to DEPSECDEF, to be signed by all three Department Secretaries. Lead Service POCs are:

- USAF: Col Mark Roddy, AF/LGMM, ext 55583
- USN: CAPT Bill Bauer, USN/N431, ext 43735
- USA: Col Roy Willis, USA/DACS-DMM, ext 56931
- USMC: Ms Pat Dalton, USMC/LP, ext 61024


This is a coordinated USAF, USN, USA, USMC memo.

cc: AFMC/LG/XP
JCS/J-4

TREVOR A. HAMMOND, Lt Gen, USAF
DCS/Logistics



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



December 3, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION


SUBJECT: Base Closure and Realignment Proposals in Support of Streamlining of
Defense Depot Maintenance Activities

To streamline defense depot maintenance activities and increase efficiency, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, shall prepare integrated proposals, with cross-Service inputs, to streamline defense depot maintenance activities, for the Secretary of Defense's consideration for submission to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510). Such proposals shall be designed to support the following lead Military Department assignments for defense-wide depot maintenance:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| Department of the Army lead | — ground weapon systems and equipment |
| Department of the Navy lead | — ships, other watercraft, and ship systems |
| Department of the Air Force lead | — fixed and rotary wing aviation and aviation systems. |

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum. Instructions to the Military Departments shall be issued through the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

DEPOT MAINTENANCE CONSOLIDATION STUDY



COL Tom Slade, USAF
Chief, J-4 SCAD

Study Purpose

- Review current capabilities
- Assess future requirements
- Recommend to CJCS a depot structure to best meet those requirements

Reduce Capacity


Eliminate Duplication



)

Consolidation Study Timetable

• DJS Directs Issue Paper Development	7 Aug
• Executive Working Group Formed	8 Sep
• Analysis Conducted Previous Studies Reviewed Service Briefings, Inputs Provided Depots Visited Cost Model Developed to Compare Alternatives	8 Sep-30 Oct
• Briefing to JCS	6 Nov
• Hardcopy Report	13 Nov




Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP

- GENERAL Joseph J. Went, USMC (Ret), Director
- GENERAL Louis C. Wagner, Jr. USA (Ret)
- GENERAL Bryce Poe II, USAF (Ret)
- VADM Eugene A. Grinstead, SC, USN (Ret)
- Mr. John McCarthy (Ret TWA Executive)

Defense Depot Maintenance Facilities




Big Business!

- \$13B annual budget - equivalent to top 30 Fortune 500 companies
- Over 700,000 pieces of equipment
 - 36,000 combat vehicles
 - 660,000 wheeled vehicles
 - 500 ships
 - 33,000 aircraft, 100+ different models
- 30 major facilities in four Services
- 130,000 civilian employees, 2,000 military

Defense Programs

Percent Change from FY 1991



— Depot Maintenance


— Military Personnel

— DoD Expenditures

— Total O&M


Military Personnel based on Active Component End Strength.
Other percentages based on then year dollars from FY93 President's Budget.

Depot Maintenance Service Cost Share (Average FY86-90)




Source: KGPM Peat Marwick

Depot Maintenance Commodity Cost Share (Average FY86-90)




Source: KGPM Peat Marwick

Aircraft Workload




Source: JDMAG

Shipyard Workload



Source: JDMAG

Capacity vs Requirements



Source: JDMAG

What's Wrong?

- Excess capacity
- Unnecessary duplicate capability
- Duplicate investments in new technology
- No effective structure/process for implementing joint solutions to excess infrastructure
- No effective structure/process to optimize cost savings
- Perceived by many that Services will not solve the problem

Study Conservatism

- Depot's capacity to absorb added workload greater than assumed
 - FY87 capacity data used
 - Data is employment sensitive
 - Pre 1987 capacities larger for same physical plant
- Outyear workload probably less than projected
 - No reductions assumed past Base Force, FY95
- Costs will be less than projected
 - FY91 costs used
 - Do not include any effects of increased competitors, other internal Service initiatives

Recommendation

- SecDef directs Services to submit integrated BRAC inputs
 - Sec Army - lead for ground systems
 - Marine Corps, Air Force, Navy input
 - Sec Navy - lead for ships
 - Sec Air Force - lead for aviation
 - Army, Navy, Marine Corps input

Recommendation

- Establish Joint Depot Maintenance Command
- Mission includes:
 - Manager for all depot maintenance
 - Responsibility for quality, cost and schedules
 - Responsibility for consolidations, workloading and standardization of work procedures
 - Recommendations for depot closure
 - Service coordination for depot modernization
 - Control of depot maintenance accounts of DBOF


Why a JDMC?

- Unity of command and effort
- Chairman, OJCS, supported CINCs have single source/point of contact for peacetime and wartime maintenance readiness
- Clear lines of communication
- Genuine authority with responsibility
- Oversight for high value resource management
- Least disruptive of major reorganizations
- Flexible - responsive - timely
- Opportunity to mature and improve
- Preserves Services accountability



Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study

Joint Depot Maintenance Command



Interservicing History (\$ Million)

	FY88	FY89	FY90	FY91
Total Depot Maintenance	13586.2	12753.3	14392.9	12809.3
Interservicing (Contract & Organic)				
Army	7.5	13.9	17.5	31.3
Navy	98.7	93.7	95.2	77.8
Air Force	249.6	192.1	106.1	235.8
Marine Corps	5.8	9.8	8	13.6
DLA	0.9	1.2	3	1.7
TOTAL	362.5	310.9	229.8	360.2
% of Total	2.7%	2.4%	1.6%	2.8%